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THE LEGITIMACY OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS
IN TENDER OFFERS
Gary G. Lyncht
Marc I. Steinbergtt
In a corporate world preoccupied with takeover attempts, at-
tention naturally gravitates to the defensive tactics employed by
target' corporations attempting to fend off exchange or tender
offers. The Williams Act, the federal statute governing takeover
bids, was enacted over a decade ago. 2  The body of case law de-
fining a target's legitimate course of conduct during an exchange
or tender offer, however, is still in its infancy.
This lack of clearly dirticulated standards permits target man-
agement to engage in a wide variety of defensive tactics, some of
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change Commission, Enforcement Division. Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Uni-
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In the tender offer context, the "target" is the corporation whose shares are being
sought by another corporation, referred to as the "bidder," in an effort to obtain control.
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), (e), 78n(d), (e), (f) (1976) (added by Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82
Stat. 454 (1968)). The Williams Act amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by
adding §§ 13(d), (e) and 14 (d), (e), (f). Unless otherwise stated, references herein are to
the amended Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
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which are of questionable legitimacy. Target management may
advise the shareholders that the board of directors considers the
tender offer "inadequate"; 4 it may pursue active opposition such
as an unprecedented dividend increase 5 or a defensive merger.6 It
may even take an action normally thought adverse to the
shareholders' interest, 7 and assert that the tactic is now "in the
best interests of the shareholders." 8 The variety of defensive tac-
tics has been limited only by the fertile imaginations of the target's
board, management, investment bankers, counsel, and other con-
sultants.9
I Ambiguity with respect to the scope of permissible target defenses becomes espe-
cially troubling in light of Judge Friendly's admonition that the contestants in a tender
fight
act quickly, sometimes impulsively, often in angry response to what they con-
sider, whether rightly or wrongly, to be low blows by the other side. Probably
there will no more be a perfect tender offer than a perfect trial. Congress
intended to assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic
requirement of laboratory conditions that might make the new statute a potent
tool for incumbent management to protect its own interests against the desires
and welfare of the stockholders.
Electronic Speciality Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2d Cir. 1969).
For a discussion of Electronic Speciality, see Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Man-
agement in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104, 1115-19 (1969).
4 See, e.g., Weeks Dredging & Cont., Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp.
468, 471-72 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660, 661-62 (D.
Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975); Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp.
1021, 1025-26 (E.D. La. 1973). For example, in Emhart, the target corporation communi-
cated to its shareholders through press releases, advertisements, and letters that the tender
offer was "quite inadequate" and was an attempt to seize control of the target "at bargain-
basement prices." 403 F. Supp. at 662.
' See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978). See also Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp.,
528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976); SEC v. Thermal Power
Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,265 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1975)
(SEC complaint).
See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (defensive sale of stock to friendly third party).
8 See notes 5-7 supra.
9 See Butler, Management's Responsibility in Responding to a Takeover, in SEVENTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (PLI) 221 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer & B. Vande-
grift eds. 1976):
Counsel and public accountants should be retained immediately upon learning
of an offer, both to evaluate the legal and financial aspects of the tender and to
prepare and evaluate the defense possibilities....
... [RIetention of investment banking advisers is an open question.... If
an exchange offer is made, it is almost mandatory to retain an investment bank-
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This Article will propose a set of solutions to these prob-
lems.10 The solutions must provide standards that are fair, defi-
nite, and clear-for both the target and the bidder. Because rec-
ommendations should build on the duties of target management
under both the Williams Act and state law, these duties will be
outlined first. This Article will then propose a set of specific dis-
closure guidelines that target management should follow in tender
offer contests. Finally, it will evaluate a number of defensive tac-
tics and will propose a test to assess their legality.
I
DUTY OF THE TARGET
The Williams Act provides the federal framework for assess-
ing the legality of defensive tactics.' I According to its sponsor,
Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey, the Act was designed to
protect the legitimate interests of the target corporation, its man-
agement and its shareholders, and simultaneously to enable both
the target and the offeror to present fairly their cases to the
ing firm to evaluate the fair value of the securities being offered. In a cash
tender, the need is less clear.
Id. at 230-31.
10 This Article will consider only defensive tactics used after a bidder has announced its
intentions. It will not analyze preventive defensive measures taken by a company to make it
less susceptible to a takeover bid prior to any bidder's indication of interest.
The Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC recently issued a public release stat-
ing its views concerning the disclosure of anti-takeover proposals in proxy statements. Se-
curities Exchange Act Release No. 15,230 (Oct. 13, 1978), [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,748. The Division specifically identified fourteen kinds of defensive corporate charter
amendments or provisions, including reincorporation in a state with an anti-takeover stat-
ute, "supermajority" approval requirements for mergers, and favoring officers with long-
term "sweetheart" contracts that cannot be abrogated or rescinded. The Division indicated
that certain basic disclosures should be made with respect to these proposals. These in-
clude: (1) the reason for the proposal; (2) the overall effects of the proposal; (3) the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the proposal; (4) how the proposal will operate; (5) whether the
proposal was voted on by the board of directors, and, if so, the result; (6) the effect that
the proposal will have on a corporation's stock listed on an exchange; and (7) comparison
of the proposal with relevant provisions of state laws. See generally Rose & Collins, Porcupine
Proposals, 12 REv. OF SEC. REG. 977 (1979).
11 Prior to the enactment of the Williams Act in 1968, a takeover bidder could avoid
federal registration and disclosure requirements by attempting to gain control of a target
corporation through an exchange or cash tender offer. As a result, the target's sharehold-
ers lacked the information necessary to assess the offer or the future value of retained
securities in the event the takeover succeeded. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1, 22 (1977).
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shareholders.12 But the Supreme Court took a narrower view of
the Act's purpose in Piper v. Chris-Crafi Industries, Inc.13 In holding
that a defeated tender offeror lacks standing to sue under the
Williams Act, the Court stated: "[T]he sole purpose of the Wil-
liams Act was the protection of investors who are confronted with
a tender offer." 4  Tactics, then, presumably should be measured
solely by their effect on target shareholders. To protect these
shareholders, both state and federal law impose two duties on the
target's management when responding to tender offers: a duty to
disclose and a general fiduciary duty.
A. Duty to Disclose
Under certain circumstances, section 14(d) of the Williams
Act 15 and statutes in many states' 6 require the target to disclose
12 Senator Williams stated: "We have taken extreme care to avoid tipping the scales
either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bids." 113
CONG. REc. 24664 (1967). See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975)
(Williams Act designed to protect shareholders without giving unfair advantage to target or
bidder); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978) (underly-
ing purpose of Act is to protect investors through full disclosure by both sides), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979).
At least one commentator has suggested that the draftsmen of the Act also sought to
discourage takeover attempts by subjecting the offeror to disclosure requirements. See Jor-
den & Woodward, An Appraisal of Disclosure Requirements in Contests for Control Under the
Williams Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 817, 827-28 (1978).
3 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
14 Id. at 35. The Piper Court held that a competing tender offeror, when suing in its
capacity as a takeover bidder, has no standing to sue for damages under § 14(e). For case
notes on Piper, see, e.g., Comment, Tender Offerors: Enter the Control Battle at Your Own Risk,
15 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 771 (1978); 55 J. URB. L. 178 (1977).
The Williams Act may have other purposes in addition to that of investor protection.
In construing § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, an anti-fraud provision similar to
§ 14(e), the Supreme Court recendy stated: "[N]either this Court nor Congress has ever
suggested that investor protection was the sole purpose of the Securities Act." United States
v. Naftalin, 99 S.Ct. 2077, 2082 (1979) (emphasis in original). For an analysis of Naftalin,
see Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEO.
L.J. 163 (1979).
'5 Section 14(d)(4) provides:
Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such a security to accept
or reject a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders shall be made in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors.
15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(4) (1976). Pursuant to this section, the SEC has promulgated rules
pertaining to disclosure in tender offer situations. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text
infra.
16 See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 207-25, 232-45 (1977).
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information relevant to the shareholders' decision to accept or re-
ject a tender offer. In addition, to shield shareholders from po-
tential misconduct by both the offeror and the target, section
14(e) of the Act contains a broad antifraud provision prohibiting
all persons from making material misrepresentations or nondisclo-
sures, or from engaging in "any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer
or... any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor
of any such offer, request, or invitation." I7 This section applies with
marked emphasis to the target corporation and its management,
as the Second Circuit aptly noted in Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.'" Referring to a possible violation of section
14(e) by the Piper family, the court remarked:
By reason of the special relationship between them, sharehold-
ers are likely to rely heavily upon the representations of cor-
porate insiders when the shareholders find themselves in the
midst of a battle for control. Corporate insiders therefore have
a special responsibility to be meticulous and precise in their
representations to shareholders. 19
B. The General Fiduciary Duty in the Tender Offer Context
In addition to the specific duty of adequate and fair disclo-
sure, corporate directors and other insiders owe a general
fiduciary duty to the corporation's'stockholders. Defensive tactics
that are not solely communicative in nature must be measured by
this duty. Most states impose on corporate management a
fiduciary duty which is independent of federal law.2° Moreover,
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green,2' a number of federal courts had held that the Williams
" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
Many states have laws with general antifraud provisions, See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§§ 352, 352-c, 353, 353-A (McKinney 1968). In addition, some states have followed the
lead of the Williams Act and enacted disclosure statutes for tender offer situations. See
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page 1978); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -534 (Michie
Supp. 1978). At least one state has even enacted an antifraud statute specifically controlling
takeover situations. See Nzv. REv. STAT. § 78.3777 (1973). See generally E. ARANow, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 16, at 207-57.
18 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
19 Id. at 364-65.
20 See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975 (Del. 1977).
21 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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Act also imposed a fiduciary duty. 22  Following Santa Fe, however,
some district courts have concluded that assessing the legitimacy
of defensive tactics is not a matter within the purview of section
14(e).23 Such an examination, these courts have asserted, involves
scrutinizing the business judgments of management and manage-
ment's adherence to the fiduciary duties owed to its shareholders
which are subjects under the province of state law rather than the
federal securities laws.2 4  In short, these courts have held that sec-
tion 14(e), at least insofar as it applies to a target corporation's use
of defensive tactics, merely requires full and fair disclosure.25
Upon analysis, it will become apparent that such an interpretation
of section 14(e)'s reach stems from an overly broad reading of
Santa Fe that does not comport with the spirit and intent of the
Williams Act.
In Santa Fe, a corporation's controlling shareholder attempted
to "freeze-out" the minority shareholders by using Delaware's
short-form merger statute. 2' The Supreme Court held that man-
agement's breach of its fiduciary duties did not violate section
10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereun-
der unless the plaintiff-minority shareholders could show misrep-
22 See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145,
1156-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
22 See, e.g., In re Sunshine Mining Co. Sec. Litigation, No. 77 Civ. 4020 (S.D.N.Y. May
25, 1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (W.D. Mich. 1978);
Halle & Stieglitz, Filor, Ballard, Inc. v. Empress Int'l, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 217 (D. Del.
1977); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
24 See, e.g., Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Altman, the target
corporation acquired another corporation as a defensive tactic to block the bidder's tender
offer. The plaintiffs brought a derivative action under § 14(e), alleging that the acquisition
served no valid business purpose. Relying upon Santa Fe, the district court held that, even
if no valid business purpose existed, the acquisition alone did not constitute a manipulative
or deceptive act under § 14(e). Furthermore, the acquisition did not require shareholder
approval. Any misrepresentations made by management regarding the transaction could
not have caused the plaintiffs' alleged injuries flowing from deprivation of the opportunity
to tender their shares. Consequently, the court concluded that the claim should be decided
under state corporate law, again citing Santa Fe. Id. at 313-14.
25 See note 23 supra. One commentator has also viewed the Williams Act as merely a
disclosure statute. Note, Target Management and Tender Offers: Proposals for Structuring the
Fiduciary Relationship, 15 HARV. J. LEG. 761, 782 (1978).
26 430 U.S. at 465-67. Under Delaware's "short-form merger" statute (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 253 (Michie 1975)), the board of directors of a parent company owning at least
90% of the stock of a subsidiary can vote to merge with the subsidiary and to purchase the
minority interest with cash payments. If they so choose, minority shareholders may peti-
tion the Delaware Court of Chancery for the payment of the "fair value" of their shares
rather than the amount offered by the parent company.
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resentation or lack of disclosure. 27  The Court noted that the ap-
plication of a "federal fiduciary principle" could interfere with the
traditional regulation of corporate conduct.2 8 Deferring to the
states, the Court concluded that:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluc-
tant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corpora-
tions that deals with transactions in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would
be overriden. 29
The Court found no such indication, either in the language of the
statute30 or in its legislative history.31 The Court, quoting from
its opinion in Cort v. Ash, also stated that "'except where federal
law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with re-
spect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of
the corporation.' "32
Upon initial examination, the Santa Fe decision could present
obstacles to imposing a federal fiduciary duty on target manage-
ment under section 14(e). First, the language of section 14(e)
closely tracks that of rule lOb-5, under which the Santa Fe
Court found no general fiduciary duty. 33  Second, the central
purpose of the Williams Act is to ensure that a target corpora-
27 "[T]he claim of fraud and fiduciary breach ... states a cause of action under any
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as 'manipulative or
deceptive' within the meaning of the statute." 430 U.S. at 473-74. For court decisions con-
struing § 10(b) after Santa Fe, see Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1079 (1978); Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977);
Biesenboch v. Guenther, 446 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978).
28 430 U.S. at 479. In Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710 (1979), the Fifth
Circuit noted that in most states, a shareholder claiming a breach of fiduciary duties by
directors must overcome a presumption that directors acted properly and that few plain-
tiffs have successfully met this burden. 577 F.2d at 1279 n.51.
29 430 U.S. at 479.
30 Id. at 474-77.
31 Id. at 477-79.
32 Id. at 479 (emphasis in original) (quoting 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975)). In Cort, the Su-
preme Court held that a shareholder of a corporation had no private cause of action against
the corporate directors for violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act, nor may he
maintain a derivative action for violations of the Act. The Court held that the Campaign
Act assured that federal elections are "free from the power of money" and that "protec-
tion of ordinary shareholders was at best a secondary concern." 422 U.S. at 81-82. The
Court also noted that the Act's legislative history gave no indication that corporate
shareholders should have a right to damages for violation of the Act.
" See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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tion's shareholders receive full and fair disclosure of all material
facts relating to the bidder's proposal and, if the target's man-
agement chooses to support or oppose the offer, full and fair dis-
closure of the facts relating to the offer as perceived by target
management. 34  Thus, the preeminent philosophy of the Williams
Act is identical to the philosophy of the entire Exchange Act:
Shareholders and potential investors should receive all important
information relevant to the operations of registered companies so
they, in turn, can make informed investment decisions. 35
But even within the context of rule lOb-5, the Santa Fe deci-
sion may not present an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs
seeking to invoke a federal cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duty.3 6  Lower courts, faced with a case of great unfairness, may
seek to avoid Santa Fe's holding by stretching to find some form
of deception. 7 Alternatively, courts may expand Santa Fe's defi-
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). In Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp.,
425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the district court, in construing § 14 of the Act, stated
that:
The primary purpose of Congress in adopting the Williams Act was to ensure
that the public shareholder confronted with a tender or exchange offer would
be provided with complete and truthful information about the offeror, the
terms and probable consequences of the offer and interests and qualifications
of any person recommending acceptance or rejection of an offer.
Id. at 1152 (footnote omitted); see note 87 infra.
35 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). This report to the Exchange Act
stated: "No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges
without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the
securities he buys or sells." See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 (W.D.
Mich. 1978).
36 The original proposal for rule 13e-3, which governs "going-private" transactions,
published for comment by the Commission in November of 1977, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 14,185, (November 17, 1977), included the requirement that a "going-private"
transaction be both substantively and procedurally fair to unaffiliated security holders.
Many commentators expressed the view that the Commission should not attempt to regu-
late the fairness of "going-private" transactions because such regulation was more properly
the province of the states. The Commission, on August 2, 1979, adopted rule 13e-3 and
Schedule 13E-3 which require the issuer to state whether it reasonably believes that the
going-private transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders. While the Com-
mission deferred its decision on the promulgation of a "federal fairness requirement" until
it could review the efficacy of the rule 13e-3 adopted, it nevertheless continued to adhere
to the position that "the views expressed in the 1977 release are sound and therefore
specifically affirms those views." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,075 (August 2,
1979).
" See Note, The "New Fraud" Becomes No Fraud: Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 31 Sw.
L.J. 739, 749 (1977).
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nition of deception, as the Second Circuit apparently did in
Goldberg v. Meridor.8 The Goldberg case involved a challenge to a
corporation's proposed issuance of shares to a parent corporation
for allegedly inadequate consideration. The suit alleged that the
defendant's prospectus and press releases which described the
transaction contained misleading disclosures and nondisclo-
sures.39 The majority noted that if the inadequacy of the consid-
eration had been disclosed, the minority shareholders could have
sought injunctive relief under New York law.40 Judge Friendly
then found that failure to disclose this unfairness was material
because of the possibility of injunctive relief, and thus it con-
stituted deception within the meaning of rule lOb-5. 41  Dissent-
ing, Judge Meskill asserted that the majority's holding ignored
Supreme Court precedent:
Those who breach their fiduciary duties seldom disclose
their intentions ahead of time. Yet under the majority's reason-
ing the failure to inform stockholders of a proposed defalcation
gives rise to a cause of action under lOb-5. Thus, the majority
has neatly undone the holdings of Green, Piper and Cort by
creating a federal cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty
that will apply in all cases, save for those rare instances where
the fiduciary denounces himself in advance.42
The Goldberg rationale has evidently been adopted by the Ninth
Circuit in the recent case of Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle: 43
[T]here is room for Rule lOb-5 liability after Santa Fe Industries
even when the only deceived parties are shareholders who are
not entitled to vote on the transaction in question, and even
though there may be a breach of fiduciary duty under state
38 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
39 Id. at 211-12.
40 Id. at 218-20.
41 Id. In concluding that the press releases contained materially misleading disclosures,
Judge Friendly employed the following widely recognized principle:
[Tihere is deception of the corporation (in effect, of its minority shareholders)
when the corporation is influenced by its controlling shareholder to engage in a
transaction adverse to the corporation's interests (in effect, the minority
shareholders' interests) and there is nondisclosure or misleading disclosures as
to the material facts of the transaction.
Id. at 217.
42 Id. at 225 (dissenting opinion, Meskill, J.).
4 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th
Cir. 1977).
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law. Indeed, under the Goldberg rationale, it is precisely because
there are state-law remedies for the shareholders that a decep-
tion can be found. Inadequate disclosures lull into security
those shareholders who might bring derivative actions under
state law to enjoin the securities transactions if all material facts
were revealed.
44
As law review commentators as well have recognized, the Goldberg
and Meikle opinions possibly open wide the doors of federal courts
to suits involving breaches of fiduciary duty.4 5
Apart from Goldberg and viewing the Williams Act on its own
footing, its basic purpose can only be fulfilled if some form of
fiduciary dtty is recognized as arising from section 14(e). It must
be remembered that the central purpose of the Williams Act is to
ensure that a target corporation's shareholders receive all the in-
formation they need to make an informed investment decision. 46
The purview of the Act therefore should not be limited to the
adequacy of disclosure but instead should be extended to protect
a shareholder's right to make a decision rather than allowing
management to make the investment decision for him. The Santa
Fe decision allows judicial effectuation of this intent; the opinion
explicitly authorizes extension of the federal securities laws into
14 597 F.2d at 1292.
45 As stated by one commentator:
[Gleneral application of the standard will allow a large number of suits involv-
ing breach of fiduciary duties against corporate directors into federal court
under rule lOb-5. As the dissent indicated, all breaches of fiduciary duty will
give rise to an action under rule lOb-5 except in those rare instances when a
breaching fiduciary adequately discloses his intentions in advance. Once the
fiduciary has decided to execute a securities transaction not in the best interests
of the corporation, he faces two unattractive alternatives: he can fully disclose
all details to the minority shareholders and thereby subject the transaction to a
possible injunction, or he can conceal pertinent information from the minority
and proceed with the transaction. By choosing to withhold information for fear
of litigation by minority shareholders, he alters the total mix of information
available and indicates his belief that the information would be significant to a
reasonable disinterested director. A federal cause of action will thus arise
whenever a fiduciary opts not to disclose facts that the minority could use to
enjoin him.
46 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 861, 875 (1978) (footnotes omitted). See Note, Goldberg v. Meridor:
The Second Circuit's Resurrection of Rule 1Ob-5 Liability for Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties
to Minority Shareholders, 64 VA. L. REv. 765, 774-77 (1978).
46 Note particularly the legislative history underlying the Act to support this assertion.
See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
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areas previously governed solely by the states when Congress
clearly intended such an expansion."a
The legislative history of the Williams Act evinces a clear
congressional intent to protect shareholders who are faced with
the difficult investment decision that must be made when pre-
sented with a tender offer. Congress chose to effectuate this end
by making certain that a target's shareholders received all material
information relating to their decision and rejected the notion that
a target's management should make the decision for the corpora-
tion in line with its fiduciary duties to the shareholders.48 The
assumption underlying Congress' approach to investor protection
under the Williams Act was that an investor has the freedom to
make his own decision after being fully informed. 49  Disclosure,
no matter how extensive, matters little if the target's management
can employ defensive tactics that deprive or otherwise materially
impede the investor's freedom of choice. The Williams Act, ac-
cordingly, provides shareholders with the right to hear a fair pre-
sentation of the material facts relating to their investment decision
when confronted with a tender offer, and to make the investment
decision upon receipt of the information.5"
" See notes 28-32 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court, in SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), recognized that Congress may create federal
fiduciary standards relating to transactions in securities. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 471 n.11. In
Capital Gains, the Court said that."Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
to be construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding
frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effecutate its remedial purposes."
375 U.S. at 195 .(footnotes omitted).
48 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Kidwell noted that Congress, in passing the Williams
Act, chose a "market approach" to investor protection rather than a "fiduciary approach."
A market approach is based on the concept that shareholders should make their own
fully-informed investment decisions. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256,
1276 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub hon. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp. 99 S.
Ct. 2710 (1979). A fiduciary approach, as defined by the Fifth Circuit, relies upon the
business judgment of corporate directors in accordance with the fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders. Id. at 1279.
9 The Fifth Circuit noted in Kidwell that shareholders have a "right" created under the
Williams Act to hear a fair presentation of the material facts: "The function of federal
regulation is to get information to the investor by allowing both the offeror and the in-
cumbent managers of a target company to present fully their arguments and then to let
the investor decide for himself." Id. at 1276. Such an interpretation accords with the Act's
legislative history; the Act was "designed to make the relevant facts known so that
shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their decision." HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, DIscLosuRE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No.
1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813.
50 If, as the Williams Act's legislative history and the Kidwell decision suggest, share-
holders have a right to hear a fair presentation of the material facts relating to a tender offer,
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Both the House and Senate Reports state that: "[The bill] is
designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of in-
vestors while at the same time providing the offeror and man-
agement equal opportunity to fairly present their case." 5 Senator
Kuchel, a strong proponent of the Act, testified that the legisla-
tion was necessary to ensure that the target's shareholders would
have sufficient information with which to make "an informed in-
vestment decision."52  Even more to the point, Chairman Cohen,
testifying on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
stated that the purpose of the bill was "to provide the investor,
the person who is required to make a decision, an opportunity to
examine and to assess the relevant facts and to reach a decision
without being pressured and without being subject to unwarranted
techniques which are designed to prevent that from happening." 53
those rights are illusory if a target's management can avoid liability by disclosing that they
intend to deprive or impede the shareholders' opportunity to consider an offer.
51 HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, DIscLosURE OF CORPORATE
EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2811, 2813; SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP.
No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967). Note also the following language from the Senate
Report: "As a practical matter, unless incumbent management explains its position publicly,
the investor is severely limited in obtaining all of the facts on which to base a decision
whether to accept or reject the tender offer." Id. at 2.
" Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on
S. 510 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. According to SEC Chair-
man Cohen, a second purpose of the bill was "to eliminate conditions surrounding the
offer which discriminate unfairly among those who may desire to tender their shares or
unreasonably restrict their freedom of action with respect to deposited shares at a time
when there is no assurance that the tender of their shares will be accepted." Takeover Bids:
Hearing on H.R. 14475 Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearing]; Senate Hearings, supra at 33. Spokesmen who testified on behalf of the American
and New York Stock Exchanges also assumed that the objective of the proposed legislation
was to furnish investors "with all material facts before being asked to make an investment
decision." Senate Hearings, supra, at 104 (statement of Ralph S. Saul, President, American
Stock Exchange). See id. at 86 (statement of G. Keith Funston, President, New York Stock
Exchange) (timely and adequate disclosure serves several purposes, including allowing
"[tihe public [to be] able to make reasoned investment decisions."); House Hearing, supra, at
47 (statement of Donald L. Calvin, Vice President, New York Stock Exchange) ("[w]hat we are
interested in here is that shareholders have ample time to make an informed decision.").
Even industry witnesses acknowledged that the bill was intended to provide the target
shareholder with adequate "information in order to make a prudent decision on whether
to accept or reject the offer." Senate Hearings, supra, at 52 (statement of Herbert F. Kahler,
Secretary and General Counsel, International Silver Co.).
13 Senate Hearings, supra note 52, at 15 (statement of Chairman Cohen) (emphasis
added).
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Thus, while the application of section 14(e) may in certain
circumstances require only an examination, of the relevant disclo-
sures for their adequacy, in those circumstances where a target's
shareholders are effectively precluded from or impeded in con-
sidering the bidder's offer because of defensive actions taken by
management, an examination of the motivations behind and the
purposes of a particular defensive action must be undertaken. Al-
though such an inquiry has traditionally been undertaken when
evaluating whether management has violated its fiduciary duties
under state law,5 4 it is difficult to perceive of a more viable
method for determining whether management acted to deprive
the shareholders of their right, or to materially impede them in
the exercise of their right, to consider a bidder's offer. In fact,
perhaps it can be said that the Williams Act created the federal
fiduciary principle that a target's management, when confronted
with a tender offer, cannot act to preclude or to materially im-
pede the target corporation's shareholders' consideration of the
offer and the making of their own investment decision. 55
5 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 n.16 (1977).
Under the existing law, the target's insiders owe their primary allegiance to
shareholders in tender offer situations. Accordingly, the Williams Act was intended to re-
quire that the targets shareholders, rather than management, make an informed decision
following full disclosure. For the sake of the future course of the law, however, the ulti-
mate wisdom of this congressional approach should be scrutinized.
Regardless of the current law, some commentators argue that noninvestor interests
should be considered in corporate decisionmaking and that, even in tender offer situations,
management should control the corporation's response to a takeover bid, after considering
both investor and noninvestor interests. See, e.g., Steinbrink, Management's Response to the
Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 882 (1978). This argument proceeds from the
premise that equity investment is merely an alternative means of capitalizing a business;
therefore, shareholders should not acquire paramount rights to direct the affairs of the
corporation. Or, in other words, that "by raising money in the public markets and by
participating in the ongoing trading markets a corporation and its management do not
thereby become absolutely subservient to the interests of investors." Id. at 901.
Steinbrink gave four reasons for his conclusion that, theoretically, management should
direct a target company's response to a tender offer. First, tender offers are no longer the
tool solely of corporate raiders and plunderers. Id. at 885-87, 889-90. Rather, they have
become a respectable alternative means of corporate acquisition. Second, if tender offers
are merely another method of corporate acquisition, management naturally should play a
leading role in shaping a corporate response because they are the ones most capable of
evaluating the adequacy of the offer and soliciting competing bids. Id. at 891-99. Third,
interests vary within the shareholder'group. Only some may wish to sell and management
is in a good position to judge whether their sale may adversely affect the broader interests
of the entire shareholder group. Id. at 894-99. Fourth, noninvestor as well as investor
interests are arguably pertinent to shaping the target's response to a tender offer. Id. at
899, 902.
Ironically, Steinbrink concluded his argument by recommending that management ob-
tain approval for its actions from a majority of shareholders. Id. at 907-08. He probably
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C. The Fiduciary Duty's Effect on Management's Response
Because they are fiduciaries, corporate directors and other in-
siders may resist a tender offer under state law only if they objec-
tively deem that the offer is inconsistent with the interests of the
intended that this proposal support management's decision. But this recommendation man-
ifests a lack of conviction in his policy reasons for allowing management to decide. If
management is the appropriate decisionmaker, no reinforcement should be needed. This is
particularly true in view of Steinbrink's position that shareholders cannot competently de-
cide whether a tender offer is wise. Id. at 891.
Similarly, it has been argued that because corporations owe a duty to society-at-large as
well as to their stockholders, a change in the target's control, having a possible adverse
impact on societal interests, must be opposed regardless of the merits of the offer to its
shareholders. Id. at 899, 902. The social responsibility of corporations is a hotly debated
topic and many noninvestor interests potentially relevant in the tender offer context can be
named: the loyal employees' interest in the target, the target's responsibility to the envi-
ronment and the community's stake in the target as a local employer, for example. If
noninvestor interests are relevant in responding to tender offers, management may be the
most appropriate decisionmaker because an individual shareholder cannot effectively weigh
these societal concerns when he is primarily concerned with his own investment. See gener-
ally Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). In a stockholder derivative
action based on Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit stated that the obligations and duties of a
corporate officer, in this case engaged chiefly in the publication of a large metropolitan
newspaper, are threefold: to the stockholders, the employees, and the public. Id. at 1091.
The court further remarked:
A corporation publishing a newspaper such as the Denver Post certainly has
other obligations besides the making of profit. It has an obligation to the pub-
lic, that is, the thousands of people who buy the paper, read it, and rely upon
its contents....
Such a newspaper corporation, not unlike some other corporations, also
has an obligation to those people who make its daily publication possible. A
great number of the employees are either members of a profession or highly
skilled and specialized in their crafts. Many of them have dedicated their lives
to this one endeavor. The appellants' sincere interest in their employees also
refutes the allegation of illegal design.
Id. at 1094-95 (footnotes omitted).
The authors agree that under certain circumstances, a corporation in its daily func-
tions may take into account the interests of its employees and the surrounding community.
However, the Williams Act was specifically designed to promote the interests of the target's
shareholders. As a consequence, during a tender offer, their interests must be considered
preeminent.
While this Article does not argue that a corporation owes no duty to the public other
than to its stockholders, or that the target's management must assess tender offers solely in
terms of their effect on its shareholders' pocketbooks, its thrust is that, under the Williams
Act, shareholders and not management must decide the fate of the target. Contrary to the
above arguments, investors may well be in the best position to accommodate all competing
interests. Each shareholder best represents his own economic interest, and tender offers,
both in their mechanism and their immediate effects, most directly concern the sharehold-
ers' property and financial interests. Furthermore, shareholders are members of society-
at-large and are more likely to constitute a representative cross-section than are the target's
insiders. If there are indeed legitimate societal interests at stake in a proposed tender offer,
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corporation and its shareholders.56 Resistance by management to
preserve their jobs and status are breaches of their fiduciary
duties.57  Moreover, insiders as fiduciaries, regardless of their
good faith beliefs, must maintain objectivity.
Although courts have declined to recognize the strong affinity
of most corporate directors and other insiders toward their corpo-
rations, this factor merits consideration. Only a rare individual
can affiliate closely with a corporation and still view an offeror's
takeover attempt with detachment. Many insiders sincerely believe
that the corporation is worth more than the offer. But even a
sincere belief may have little basis in commercial reality.5" Insid-
a concerned management can communicate them to the shareholders. If the management's
powers of persuasion and the shareholders' own balancing of interests do not result in a
response to the takeover bid consistent with the alleged noninvestor interests, the validity
of those interests may be suspect.
Finally, permitting the target's insiders to preclude or impede shareholder consider-
ation of a tender offer due to noninvestor interests would merely amplify present oppor-
tunities for misconduct. Managements now plausibly argue that almost any defensive tactic
is in the best interests of the target's shareholders. Allowing them to rely on noninvestor
interests would provide another source of smokescreen for masking unacceptable motives
for opposing takeover bids. Accordingly, consideration of noninvestor factors would un-
duly add to the indefiniteness of the law and would increase the courts' reliance on the
purported expertise of the target's insiders. Such an interpretation, as urged by some
commentators, would not comport with the spirit of the Williams Act nor would it comply
with the insiders' fiduciary duties under state law.
56 Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969):
[M]anagement has the responsibility [under state law] to oppose offers whicl,
in its best judgment, are detrimental to the company or its stockholders. In
arriving at such a judgment, management should be scrupulously fair in con-
sidering the merits of any proposal submitted to its stockholders. The officers'
and directors' informed opinion should result from that strict impartiality
which is required by their fiduciary duties.
Id. at 712-13. See Butler, supra note 9, at 224-29; note 16 supra.
57 See Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petro. Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 273-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Note the
following statement of state fiduciary obligation issued by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Singer:
While technically not trustees.... [corporate directors] stand in a fiduciary rela-
tion to the corporation and its stockholders.... The rule that requires an undi-
vided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no
conflict between duty and self-interest. The occasions for the determination of
honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no hard and
fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed
scale.
Id. at 977 (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939)).
58 Most shareholders do not share this strong attachment to the target corporation.
Rather, they invest for the purpose of realizing as large a return as possible. In tender
offer and exchange offer situations these shareholders consider seriously such factors as
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ers must acknowledge that objectivity is difficult to maintain. Ac-
cordingly, management should take special care to make its as-
sessment of the tender offer as neutral and thorough as possible.
At the very least, management should employ independent in-
vestment bankers and legal counsel to scrutinize the offer.5 9
In light of its fiduciary duty to the stockholders, target man-
agement responding to a tender offer-even if it deems the offer
inadequate-should consider at least two factors. First, they
should estimate the percentage of shareholders who would tender
their stock given adequate disclosure. Regardless of management's
view of the offer, many shareholders may accept an offer for a
variety of meritorious reasons. For example, those seeking capital
gains may take the offer to realize a significant premium over the
stock's current market price. Alternatively, shareholders interested
in a regular source of income may receive significantly higher div-
idends from the offeror under the terms of an exchange offer
than from the target.60 By resisting the offer, management may
deprive such shareholders of the maximum profits from their in-
vestment. Managemeryt owes a duty to its transient shareholders
as well as its shareholders of long standing and should discover
the aims and goals of all types of shareholders. 6' Taking these
factors into consideration, if management's resistance is not objec-
tively well-founded, the insiders may be liable to the shareholders
for depriving them of the opportunity to tender their stock.6"
the premium offered by the bidder, the dividend policy of both the target and the offeror,
and the future growth prospects of both corporations. Directors' unsubstantiated feelings
that the tender offer is inadequate should be deemed irrelevant by the courts.
5 See note 9 supra.
60 See Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try A Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV.
991 (1973). This commentator remarks that most shareholders wish only to maximize their
investment. Thus, in determining whether to tender, target shareholders
must decide whether to disinvest and accept the offered premium. In order to
make this decision, many shareholders will merely question whether the offer-
ing price is sufficiently above the market price; if it is, they will tender. Some
shareholders will be swayed by other considerations, primarily the target's fu-
ture under the offeror's control.
Id. at 995 (footnotes omitted).
61 As the Second Circuit noted in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969): "The speculators and chartists of Wall and Bay
Streets are also 'reasonable' investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded con-
servative traders." Id. at 849.
62 See Reeves v. Texas Gulf, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 579, 357 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1974). A
law review commentator has recently argued: "Improper motivation is not, however, man-
agement's only failure in responding to tender offers. When management chooses litigation as
its response, the stockholders who are damaged thereby should subsequently be permitted
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Second, in determining whether to oppose a tender offer,
management should weigh the political and economic costs to the
corporation and its shareholders of a prolonged takeover battle.
Even if management should ultimately prevail, the internal con-
flict potentially resulting from the takeover attempt may destroy
the value of the defense. If the target's board of directors split
deeply'over their response to the bidder's offer, or if a large
number of shareholders indicate that they wish to tender, the
political costs of opposition may be prohibitive.6 3  Moreover, the
insiders should consider the costs of litigation in opposing a
takeover attempt. A prolonged takeover struggle may strain the
target's financial resources, particularly if it is a relatively small or
marginally profitable corporation. 64  In view of these adverse
consequences, target's management should acquiesce to, or at least
not oppose, a tender offer if it concludes that the probable costs
of fighting the takeover attempt outweigh the detrimental effects
of the offer.65
If the target's management determines, after considering its
fiduciary obligations, that a tender offer is not in the best interest
of the corporation or its shareholders, it may then implement all
appropriate defensive tactics. The following sections of this Article
will examine certain tactics and the circumstances under which
they may be legitimately employed. As is discussed in the next
section, the extent of the target's disclosure of the terms of the
tender offer to its shareholders is critically important.
to challenge such action irrespective of the board's motivation." Weiss, Tender Offers and
Management Responsibility, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 445, 451 (1978).
63 Although a majority of shareholders may wish to maximize their investments, others
may hold the stock for different reasons. As Judge Duffy commented in Singer v. Mag-
navox Co., 380 A. 2d 969 (Del. 1977): "[Oithers may have differing investment goals, tax
problems, a belief in the ability of... management to make them rich, or even a sentimen-
tal attachment to the stock which leads them to have a different judgment as to the desira-
bility of selling out." Id. at 977 n.8 (quoting Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. 000268 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1975)).
64 As one reporter has recently pointed out: "The takeover trend has also been a
bonanza for the investment bankers and lawyers who advise both the acquiring companies
and their targets." NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 1979, at 68.
65 One commenator has observed that "management may be doing a disservice to a
large number of stockholders where it seeks judicial intervention to enjoin the offer. The
fiduciary obligation of directors is, by definition, owed to all stockholders." Weiss, note 62
supra, at 452.
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II
"INADEQUACY" OF THE OFFER-TARGET MANAGEMENT'S
DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Under the Williams Act, target management may abstain
from either publicly supporting or opposing the tender offer.66
Once management decides to resist or support the takeover
attempt, however, certain obligations accrue. 67 Rule 14d-4,
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
pursuant to section 14(d)(4) of the Act, requires the target's manage-
ment to file a Schedule 14D with the Commission if it decides to
make a recommendation to its shareholders.6 8 In addition, much
of the information revealed in a Schedule 14D disclosure must
also be summarized in any recommendation communicated to the
shareholders. 69 This requirement obligates management to dis-
close the reasons supporting its recommendation.7 0 Although
rule 14d-4 may serve a useful function in certain circumstances,
the heart of the federal enforcement process lies in section14(e),
the antifraud provision.71
66 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 220 n.2
(1973):
[Tlhe failure of [§ 14(d)-(e)] to require incumbent management to make a
statement regarding the offer was not inadvertent. The legislative history of the
Williams Bill clearly indicates that Congress was well aware of the importance
of a statement by incumbent management setting forth its views regarding the
offer.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968)). In February 1979, the Commission requested comments on rules
requiring target's management to make a statement expressing either favor, disapproval, or
the inability to take a position. See Securities Act Release No. 6,022, Exchange Act Release
No. 15,548, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,575 (Feb. 5, 1979).
67 See Butler, supra note 9, at 226-29.
6' Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1978); Schedule 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101
(1978). Disclosure requirements of rule 14d-4 and Schedule 14D include management's
reasons supporting its recommendations, any arrangements or understandings between
target management and the offeror, the identity and employment capacity of the persons
making recommendations to the shareholders, and information as to all transactions af-
fected during the 60 days prior to the filing of the Schedule in the securities that are the
subject of an exchange offer.
69 Rule 14d-4(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(c) (1978). See Note, A Proposal for Affirmative
Disclosure by Target Management During Tender Offers, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 200-01 (1975).
70 See note 68 supra.
" See note 17 and accompanying text supra. At least one commentator believes that
§ 14(d) and (e) do not sufficiently protect shareholders' interests. That author criticized these
subsections primarily because the target corporation can avoid the disclosure requirements
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Management's recommendation to its shareholders that they
should reject an unfriendly tender offer because it is "in-
adequate" 72 must be measured-like all communications to
shareholders-by the standards of section 14(e). Scrutiny under
section 14(e) is needed in this situation because management often
unfairly contrasts the strong performance and expectations of the
target with the problems and dreary prospects of the offeror.73
These communications may provide reasons why shareholders
should reject a tender offer. But management is often unduly
quick to pinpoint the offeror's weaknesses, neglecting to mention
the positive aspects of the offer-that it may provide a substantial
premium over the current market price of the target or impres-
sive dividends over those currently generated by the target, for
example. 4 This type of information is critically important to the
prudent investor faced with the difficult decision of whether to
tender his shares.7
of the Williams Act by declining to make a recommendation to its shareholders. To remedy
this situation, the commentator recommends that an affirmative duty be imposed on target
management to disclose material nonpublic information in its possession. Such an ap-
proach, this commenator argues, complies with the strong congressional policy of the Wil-
liams Act favoring fair and complete disclosure for the benefit of the target's shareholders.
Note, supra note 25, at 778-84, 785-89. But Congress specifically avoided requiring such a
duiy. See note 28 supra.
72 E.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp., Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978); Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F.
Supp. 660 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975).
73 See, e.g., Weeks Dredging & Cont., Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp.
468, 471-72 (E.D. Pa. 1978); A & K Railroad Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R.,
437 F. Supp. 636, 642-43 (E.D. Wis. 1977). In A & K Railroad, the target president stated
in a newspaper article that in his opinion the offeror "is not a reliable and responsible
organization in financial matters, such as the maneuvers they are now attempting." 437 F.
Supp. at 642. The court found that this statement did not constitute a § 14(e) violation.
14 E.g., Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Mass.), vacated on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1975); Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. La.
1973). For example, in Cauble the offeror sought to make a cash tender offer of $41 per
share. The defendant's description of the offer failed to mention that the market price of
the target's stock, over the months prior to the proposed offer, had fluctuated between $29
and $33 per share. In addition the defendant misleadingly stated that the stock price
should be $100 per share when he had no basis for such a statement. Id.
5 In providing for shareholder protection, the Williams Act "is founded on the princi-
ple that full and fair disclosure of all material facts must be made in connection with all
tender offers so that investors may have the benefit of all significant facts in making their
investment decisions." Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388,
393 (8th Cir. 1976); see Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199, 210 (D. Md.
1976).
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Accordingly, if the bidder has not directly communicated the
terms of the offer, such as where the target refuses to supply the
bidder with a shareholder list, 76 it should be incumbent upon
target management to describe the terms. In Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc. 77 Medicorp, in both a press release and a
letter to its investors, described the Humana offer as "inadequate"
and "not in the best interests of shareholders."r7 In these com-
munications, Medicorp failed to describe any of the positive as-
pects of the Humana offer, including the opinion of its own in-
vestment advisor, who valued the Humana preferred stock, which
was one subject of the exchange offer, at a clear premium over
the market price of Medicorp stock.79  Holding that Medicorp's
description of the Humana offer violated section 14(e), the court
enunciated the following principle:
[O]nce Medicorp chose to communicate [to its shareholders]
and, in particular, to characterize the offer as "inadequate" and
"not in the best interests of" the shareholders, it was obligated
to furnish its stockholders with all the information it had from
Humana so that the stockholders would be sufficiently in-
formed to react intelligently to the offer and would not be un-
fairly influenced by management's subjective presentation."0
76 A key question that remains unsettled is whether the target corporation must turn
over its shareholder list to an unfriendly tender offeror. In Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc.
v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), Judge Weinfeld held that once
target management turned over its shareholder list to a friendly offeror, it was obligated
under the Williams Act to do the same for a competing offeror:
Management's decision to turn its shareholder list over to a "friendly" offeror
and to withhold it from a competing offeror would offend express congres-
sional concern in adopting the Williams Act that both the offeror and manage-
ment (and here a friendly offeror) have an "equal opportunity to fairly present
their case," and that "public shareholders who are confronted by a cash tender
offer for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate informa-
tion regarding [the offer]." In effect, the shareholder's ability to make up his
own mind about competing tender offers upon a full presentation of all mate-
rial facts is impaired by this sort of management action.
Id. at 1165 (footnotes omitted). See generally Note, Tender Offers and Bidder Access to Target
Company Shareholder Lists, 1978 BRIGHAM YOUNG U.L. REv. 436. But see A & K Railroad
Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 437 F. Supp. 636, 642-45 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The
SEC's proposed tender offer rules provide for access by the bidder to the target's
shareholder list. The Commission anticipated final rulemaking action on this proposal by
Fall, 1979. See [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,935.
71 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
1978).
78 Id. at 92,824-25.
79 Id. at 92,833. See generally note 35 and accompanying text supra.
80 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 92,833. Some courts have
ordered the defendant who issues the misleading statement to send a corrective letter to
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Requiring full disclosure of the terms of the offer only
slightly burdens target management and has particular value
when management describes the bidder in less than glowing
terms. Unless the target's shareholders receive all relevant infor-
mation relating to the terms of the offer, they may well discount
all representations made by the bidder.
As an additional check on such a shareholder reaction, man-
agement also should disclose all material facts relating to the favor-
able aspects of the offer if it advises the shareholders that the
offer is inadequate. In determining the proper materiality stan-
dard in the tender offer context, attention once focused on Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 81 where the Supreme Court, in a proxy
solicitation case, formulated a materiality standard that turned on
whether the misstatement or omission "might have been consid-
ered important by a reasonable shareholder." 82  But in TSC In-
dustries v. Northway, Inc.,83 another case involving a proxy solicita-
tion, the Court adopted a more stringent standard focusing on
whether there was a "substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider [the omitted or misstated infor-
the corporation's shareholders. For example, in Weeks Dredging, a newspaper article quoted
the target's president as saying that the corporation's stock was worth $150 per share and
that the company was "shaping up all right." Weeks Dredging & Cont., Inc. v. American
Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468, 471-72 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The court found that both of
these statements violated § 14(e) of the Williams Act and ordered the corporation's presi-
dent to write a corrective letter to shareholders which stated:
I am writing to you with reference to an article that you may have seen or
heard about that appeared in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin on January 13,
1978. In that article, I was quoted as saying that the value of American
Dredging stock was conservatively worth $150 per share. This valuation was
based on my estimation of the value of the assets of the Company on a per
share basis and not on what I believed you could receive on the market today
for your shares. In order for the shareholders to realize significantly more than
the current market price of the shares at this time, it would be necessary for
the company's earnings position to improve.
Furthermore, in the Bulletin article, I was quoted as saying that the Company
was "shaping up all right." By that statement I meant that the Company was
realizing a profit this year and that that profit was the result of a settlement
award in a condemnation proceeding. However, it was not meant and should
not mean to you that the operating revenues from the Company's dredging
business had increased; in fact, the Company has suffered an operating loss in
1977 in its dredging business.
451 F. Supp. at 472. For a similar misstatement by an insider followed by a court order to
send a corrective letter, see Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021, 1029 (E.D. La. 1973).
81 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
82 Id. at 384.
83 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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mation] important in deciding how to vote."84  Courts have gen-
erally applied the Northway standard to tender offer communica-
tions.85
For example, when an exchange offer is made, most
shareholders would consider the value of the offered securities
important in assessing the offer. If management has valued the
securities offered by the bidder, and particularly when it retains
an independent consultant with corporate funds to appraise the
offer, the shareholders should be apprised of this valuation.8 6
Similarly, in an exchange offer, shareholders would deem impor-
tant the amount of dividends they would receive if they accepted
the offer. Accordingly, management should inform target
shareholders of the offeror's dividend rate. The materiality of
other omitted information probably must be determined on an ad
hoc basis. The focus of the test, however, should remain the
same: Courts should assess materiality through the eyes of a
reasonable investor who owns the target's stock primarily to make
a profit on his investment.
87
84 Id. at 449. Yet this standard does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable shareholder to change his
vote. Id.
It is interesting to note that the Humana court stated that the target, once having
recommended rejection of the offer, was obligated to furnish its shareholders with all in-
formation it possessed regarding the bidder, not merely material information. Humana,
Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. 96,286
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978). Because of the huge mass of information that a target normally
receives from an offeror, however, the court in all likelihood meant that only material
information need be communicated. But because of management's subjective disposition,
all doubts regarding materiality should be resolved in favor of stockholder transmission.
Also, although a statement may not be false, it may be misleading in the context in
which it is made. If a reasonable shareholder would draw false conclusions from the state-
ment, then the communication may well be deficient under the Williams Act. See Weeks
Dredging & Cont., Inc. v. American Dredging, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 468, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
85 See, e.g., Weeks Dredging & Cont., Inc. v. American Dredging, Inc., 451 F. Supp.
468, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,144 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976). For
decisions which applied the more lenient materiality test before Northway, see, e.g., Missouri
Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 393 (8th Cir. 1976); Pargas, Inc. v.
Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199, 210 (D. Md. 1976).
"8 See Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (W.D. Mich. 1978)
(target's representation that offering price was inadequate while failing to disclose opinion
of investment banker that such offering price was fair and substantial stated to be violative
of section 14(e)).
87 The goal of full and fair disclosure for the benefit of shareholders is a central ingre-
dient of the Williams Act. The concept of materiality should be viewed in this light. As
stated by Senator Williams:
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When applying this standard, courts should be sensitive to the
plight of shareholders, who are often bombarded with conflicting
information during the midst of a hostile tender offer. First the
bidder, then the management of their own corporation, and often
the press barrage the beleaguered investors.8 8 After these
assaults on three fronts, shareholders must choose between the
bidder's offer and the recommendation of their corporation's
management. But the battle to persuade the investors all too fre-
quently is one-sided; as the Second Circuit noted in Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,89 "shareholders are likely to
rely heavily" on management's representations. Thus, manage-
ment has "a special responsibility to be meticulous and precise" in
communications to shareholders,9" and any doubts concerning
questions of materiality should be resolved in favor of disclo-
sure.
9 1
Not only should the substance of the disclosure be accurate,
but the presentation must be designed to fairly inform share-
holders of all material facts in a straightforward manner. Target
management cannot fulfill its special obligation to shareholders by
disclosing the beneficial aspects of the offer in a way that lessens
their significance. For instance, if management makes broad
statements that the tender offer is "inadequate" or an exchange
The committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regula-
tion either in favor of management or in favor of the person making the
takover [sic] bid. The bill is designed to require full and fair disclosure for the
benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and manage-
ment equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
88 A target's management may retain a public relations firm for the purpose of improv-
ing the image of the target's management, or even tarnishing the bidder's image during
the course of the offer. For a description of the types of publicity a target's management
may wish to generate, see E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 66, at 268-71.
89 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
90 Id. at 364-65.
" Courts should resolve doubts in favor of disclosure because some shareholders may
consider important a factor that management thought to be insignificant. As stated by the
district court in Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petro. Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1975):
[I]t must always be remembered that the protections of the Williams Act ex-
tends to all shareholders of the target company-both those who intend to
divest themselves of ownership and those who do not. Both groups must be
assured full, fair and adequate disclosure so that their decision to tender or
retain their shares will be predicated upon a knowledgeable and informed
evaluation of the alternatives.
Id. at 273.
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offer is of "speculative value" in the text of a letter to
shareholders, while inserting the favorable aspects of the offer in
a footnote or in an addendum to the shareholder letter, it may
well violate section 14(d). 2  Management should ensure that all
material facts, regardless of whether they support or oppose its
position, are disclosed to the target corporation's shareholders on
as equal a basis as practicable.
Often, however, merely communicating their disapproval of a
bidder's offer fails to satisfy a target's insiders; rather, they will
opt to oppose the offer with more forceful defensive tactics. The
next section of this Article proposes a framework for judicial
evaluation of the legality of defensive tactics.
III
PROVING THE LEGITIMACY OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS-
THE RECOMMENDED ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
AND ITS APPLICATION
Once management decides to oppose a tender offer, it faces
the delicate question of what defensive tactics to employ. 93 In the
selection process, management must consider several factors, in-
cluding the likelihood of success by the bidder, the current mar-
ket price and dividend rate of the target, and the number of
target shares held by friendly and hostile stockholders. For exam-
ple, if the insiders believe that shareholders are likely to approve
the offer, management may enter into a defensive merger. 94 Al-
ternatively, if management controls only a small percentage of the
outstanding stock, it may decide to issue or sell additional shares
to a friendly third party,95 or even make its own tender offer to
its shareholders,96 so that the bidder will be less likely to acquire
the desired percentage of the target's stock.
92 The Williams Act "discloses a clear congressional determination that full and fair
disclosure is required in connection with every tender offer." Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas
Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199, 210 (D. Md. 1976) (emphasis added).
93 A number of works have discussed tactical strategies target management should con-
sider. See, e.g., E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 66, at 219-76; Butler, supra note 9, at
221; Note, supra note 3.
9' Two authors have characterized a defensive merger as "not a defense tactic, but
rather a form of orderly retreat, and one would expect that unless such a merger was
being actively considered prior to the tender offer, it would be viewed by incumbent man-
agement only as a last, albeit very effective, resort." Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over
Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAw. 115, 132 (1967).
95 See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 114
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
96 See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Regardless of the defensive tactics employed, state law and
the Williams Act mandate that target management owes its al-
legiance to the shareholders. Maneuvers used to perpetuate man-
agement's status or in some manner to prevent an informed deci-
sion by the target's shareholders violate these protective laws.
Therefore, the legitimacy of a given defensive tactic should turn
not only on the tactic used, but also on the effect of the tactic on
the shareholders' right to decide, the reasons management relies
upon for employing the tactic, and the extent of disclosure to the
shareholders.
A. The Recommended Analytical Framework
Courts assessing the legality of defensive tactics under the
Williams Act have adopted a variety of tests, but most courts cur-
rently apply one of two tests: the "business purpose" test and the
"primary purpose" test. Courts applying the business purpose test
search for a valid business purpose for management's employ-
ment of the maneuver.97  In contrast, those that have adopted
the primary purpose test query whether the principal or primary
purpose of the defensive tactic was to benefit the target corpora-
tion's shareholders or to impede the bidder's takeover attempt. 98
Under the business purpose test, target management can jus-
tify its conduct by merely showing that the tactic employed had
some business purpose. 99 In fact, some courts find for manage-
ment unless the plaintiff proves that the sole purpose of the man-
17 See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,286, at 92,833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978) ("the record does
contain evidence of sound business reasons for increasing the cash dividend and issuing a
stock dividend"). Other courts have stated this test negatively. See, e.g., Applied Digital Data
Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("[Applied Digi-
tal's] burden of proof.., is to demonstrate ... that the defendants had no valid business
purpose in attempting to effect the sale of Milgo stock to Racal").
"9 See, e.g., Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,863, at 91,136 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) ("this Court finds
that the sole, primary, compelling and controlling purpose of the Sar acquisition was to
thwart the Monogram tender offer").
99 See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,286, at 92,833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978) (evidence of sound
business reasons for dividend increase resulted in finding of no potential showing for a
breach of Williams Act despite extraordinary departure from prior policy and timing of
increase-two days after tender offer announcement).
1979]
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agement's maneuver was to defeat the tender offer and that this
sole purpose was unrelated to any legitimate business objective.' 00
The business purpose test poses a nearly insurmountable ob-
stacle for plaintiffs challenging defensive tactics. Regardless of the
tactic employed, management can easily manufacture a "legiti-
mate" corporate purpose for* its action, even when it employed the
tactic solely to perpetuate its own status. This is particularly true
when management employs expert counsel to lay a foundation for
and to structure its actions. In addition, many courts are reluctant
to substitute their own judgment for management's business
judgment. Besieged with business reasons justifying the use of a
maneuver, a court applying the business purpose test frequently
finds itself compelled to legitimize the corporate conduct.10 1 Ex-
cept in the most egregious cases, management will predictably
prevail and deprive the target shareholder of the opportunity to
consider the bidder's offer. This judicially-imposed result eviscer-
ates the legislative policy choice embodied in the Williams Act.
The second test used by the courts, which looks to the pri-
mary purpose underlying the corporate conduct,'0 2 is more consis-
tent with the intent of the Williams Act. This test, however, also
fails to allocate the burden of persuasion in the most rational and
flexible manner; it does not recognize that certain situations call
for the application of different standards in order to reach the
"I See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1158
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
101 See Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712-13 (N.D. Ill.
1969). Another court has stated a different approach:
[A] Delaware Court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a merger when a
freeze-out of minority stockholders on a cash-out basis is alleged to be its sole
purpose. In such a situation, if it is alleged that the purpose is improper be-
cause of the fiduciary obligation owed to the minority, the Court is duty-bound
to closely examine that allegation even when all of the relevant statutory for-
malities have been satisfied.
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977). See Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc.
v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
102 See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975) (application of "prin-
cipal purpose" test to management's issuance of stock upheld). Considerations under state
law are similar. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del. Ch.
1967). In Condec, the court stated "Where, however, the objective sought in the issuance of
stock is not merely the pursual of a business purpose but also to retain control, it has been
held to be a mockery to suggest that the 'control' effect of an agreement in litigation is
merely incidental to its primary business objective." 230 A.2d at 776 (citation omitted).
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most equitable results. For example, even if the primary purpose
of the target's action is to defeat a takeover attempt which it be-
lieves is not in the shareholders' best interests, management
should be free to take such action provided that the tactic does
not preclude or materially impede the shareholders' consideration
of the offer. On the other hand, if management's action effec-
tively impedes or forecloses the shareholders from considering the
offer, the complainants should not be required to demonstrate
target management's motivation underlying the defensive tactic.
Because of the serious consequences of this latter group of defen-
sive tactics, management should bear the burden of persuasion to
establish that its primary motivation was not to preclude or mate-
rially impede shareholder consideration of the offer.
An equitable test to assess the legality of a defensive tactic
under section 14(e) should recognize the different practical effects
that various defensive tactics have on the target's shareholders-
the prime beneficiaries of the Williams Act. Because the fiduciary
duty aspects of the Williams Act focus on the right of sharehold-
ers to make an informed decision, target management's acts
should be scrutinized in relation to their encroachment on this
right. A defensive tactic that effectively impedes or precludes the
shareholders from considering a tender offer should not be
judged by the same standards used to judge a defensive tactic that
has little effect on such consideration. Although courts have
applied different tests in evaluating defensive tactics, no distinc-
tions have yet been drawn with respect to the effect of the par-
ticular tactic upon the shareholder.
The following two-tier analysis would effectuate the policies
of the Williams Act and reflect the qualitative differences in the
effect of defensive tactics: (1) Defensive tactics that have little ef-
fect on a shareholder's opportunity to consider the bidder's offer
should not be construed to violate section 14(e) unless the target's
management has made material misrepresentations or omissions
with respect to the tactic; 103 (2) regarding defensive tactics that
preclude or otherwise materially impede the target's shareholders'
consideration of the offer, the challenging shareholder should ini-
tially be required to show that the tender offer was a factor in
103 As discussed in the text accompanying notes 51-55 supra, the concept of materiality
should be liberally interpreted in assessing communications made during a tender offer
battle.
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inducing the target management to take the particular action at
that time, thereby giving rise to a presumption that the primary
reason for the action was to block or impede the takeover bid.
Target management may rebut this presumption by showing that
the primary reason for the action was not to effectively impede
shareholder consideration of the offer.'0 4
In applying the proposed test, courts must decide, at the
threshold, whether the defensive tactic has little effect on a
shareholder's opportunity to consider the bidder's offer, or
whether it precludes or otherwise materially impedes shareholder
consideration of the offer. As a matter of definition, all defensive
tactics arguably impede the bidder's offer. For practical applica-
tion, however, this test should focus on whether the target's
shareholders, rather than target management, will make the ulti-
mate decision as to the disposition of their shares of stock and the
future of the target corporation. 05
B. Defensive Tactics Not Precluding or Materially Impeding
Shareholder Consideration
Examples of. defensive tactics that generally will not affect a
shareholder's right to consider a bidder's offer include dividend
increases,' 0 6 and under certain circumstances, the identification
and seduction of a "white knight."
1. Dividend Increases
Target management may raise dividend rates in order to dis-
courage or help defeat tender offers. A dividend increase can
cause an increase in the market price of the target's stock to rise
104 Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Con-
gress or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the pre-
sumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party
on whom it was originally cast.
105 In addition, even assuming that the business objective in employing a certain defen-
sive tactic was to serve a legitimate corporate end, that measure may never have been
engaged in at that time if there had not been an unfriendly tender offer. See generally Klaus
v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
106 For a discussion of the similar use of stock splits, see note 117 infra.
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in reflection of the increased return per share.1 7  In the event of
a tender offer, it can reduce the difference between the bidder's
offer and the market price so that the offering price appears less
attractive to the target's shareholders. 0 8
Shareholders usually benefit from this defensive maneuver;
they obtain a greater return on their investment while retaining
the option of accepting the offer. Thus, the target should not be
required to absolutely freeze its dividend policy once an offer is
announced. But to prevent misleading the shareholders, target
management should point out that an increase in the stock's mar-
ket price may be due to the dividend increase rather than to the
market's perception of improved prospects for the corporation.
Target management should also furnish the shareholders with full
information regarding the dividend increase. This disclosure
should include: (1) The reason for the increase, (2) prospects for
continuing that dividend level, and (3) the effect of the dividend
on the company's ability to sustain its current growth rate. Failure
to provide this information, particularly when target management
does nQt realistically expect to continue paying its higher dividend
rate, should constitute a deceptive or fraudulent practice pro-
scribed by section 14(e) of the Williams Act. 10 9
Under the business purpose test currently used by many
courts, a finding of any valid business reason to support the
change in dividend policy results in a conclusion of no violation.
This test is incorrectly focused and imposes too few disclosure re-
107 See Schmults & Kelly, supra note 94, at 117-18; Note, supra note 3, at 1119-20.
108 See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 66, at 245-46.
When industrialist George W. Murphy bid for shares of Sharon Steel Cor-
poration in June 1966, Sharon promptly boosted the annual dividend from 60
cents to 80 cents a share. This maneuver is one of the most common responses
in attempting to rebuff an unsolicited takeover bid; more than one third of the
companies in our study undertook this defense. The strategy behind it is the
dual hope of winning shareholder support with more income and of driving up
the price of the stock. Although it may be claimed that management is unethi-
cal in "buying off" shareholders with "their own" profits, the tactic has often
bad the desired effect and cannot be ignored.
Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HAty. Bus. REv. 135, 143 (March-April
1967).
109 The drafters of the Williams Act intended for it to protect the target corporation's
shareholders. If courts are to construe the statute to fulfill this objective, they must
scrutinize the target corporation's actions and ensure that full and complete disclosure is
made to the shareholders. The motives for increasing dividends must be revealed or the
1979] 929
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quirements upon target management. For example, in Humana,
Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc.," t0 two days after the bidder an-
nounced that it intended to make an exchange offer, Medicorp,
the target, raised its dividend rate from fifteen to fifty cents per
share and declared a four percent stock dividend, the first such
dividend in the company's history.'11 In determining whether
Medicorp's dividend tactic violated section 14(e) of the Williams
Act, the district court applied the business purpose test:
It is difficult to believe that the extraordinary departure
from prior dividend policy approved by the Medicorp Board
two days after Humana advised it of the offer was not prompted
at least in part by Medicorp's unhappy reaction to the offer
itself. However, the record does contain evidence of sound bus-
iness reasons for increasing the cash dividend and issuing a
stock dividend. 112
The court's holding, although a sound application of the bus-
iness purpose test, demonstrates the inadequacy of that test. First,
management satisfied the test'1 3 despite the court's implication
that the proposed exchange offer was the primary motivating fac-
tor behind the dividend increase." 4  Second, looking for a busi-
ness purpose ignores important Williams Act policies; even if an
action had a business purpose, management's misleading or
nonexistent disclosures may have prevented the shareholders
from making the informed decision that the Williams Act guaran-
tees them. Hence, the business purpose test, in this context,
removes the decision from the shareholders and gives it to the
insiders. The confluence of these factors permitted target
management to avoid adequate disclosure of the reason for the
dividend increase. In its letter to shareholders announcing the
shareholders will not possess all the relevant information to make an informed decision on
the tender offer.
110 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 96,286, at 92,823 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 5, 1978).
"' Id. at 92,824.
112 Id. at 92,833. For an analysis of the business purpose test and its drawbacks, see text
accompanying notes 99-101 supra. The court further remarked: "Medicorp was doing well
and it is not at all clear that the dividends actually authorized September 29th were not
perfectly justifiable on the basis of business considerations alone." Id.
113 Id. at 92,824-25. Such reasons included the growing strength of the corporation,
increased earnings and gross revenues, a low debt to equity ratio, and a tenfold rise in the
price of Medicorp's stock during the previous three years.
114 Id. at 92,833. Even assuming that the business objective in employing a certain defen-
sive tactic served a legitimate corporate end, that measure may never have been under-
taken at that time without an unfriendly tender offer.
930 [Vol. 64:901
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new dividend policy, Medicorp attributed the increase to the
growing strength of the corporation; 115 it made no mention that
the dividend change was due, at least in part, as a reaction to the
proposed exchange offer. Because it could easily establish a busi-
ness purpose, Medicorp escaped liability on this point with little
difficulty. 16  Under a test more closely tailored to the objectives
of the Williams Act, management's failure to disclose the material
reasons for the change in dividend policy should constitute a sec-
tion 14(e) violation."'
2. Defensive Mergers
Management may also resist a takeover bid by negotiating a
merger with a third party, or "white knight." This tactic tends to
be a last resort for management, and, frequently, can be success-
ful. 118  If the target's management believes that the bidder's ten-
der offer will be successful when presented to its shareholders but
also believes that a merger could be negotiated with a third party
that would be more beneficial to the target's shareholders, man-
115 Id. at 92,824.
116 The Humana court did grant a preliminary injunction against the target management
for making misleading disclosures, but the court found other grounds for this decision-
the disclosures relating to the dividend increase were not sufficient to justify an injunction.
Id. at 92,833.
117 A stock split is a defensive tactic which often causes the target's stock price to rise
independently of the bidder's offer. Although a stock split may result in a price increase in
the target's stock, it does not change the target's ownership or control and does not impede
the bidder's ability to make an offer or the target's shareholders ability to consider it. The
adequacy of the disclosure regarding the stock split should be the primary concern of the
courts. If disclosure is complete and accurate, courts should hold that the stock split does
not violate § 14(e).
11 See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 108, at 146-47. An example illustrates this tactic's
effectiveness.
In February 1966 a cash tender offer was announced on behalf of a then-
undisclosed group of investors at $65 a share. The group was seeking 60% of
the outstanding shares. The management of Phoenix, which had been showing
heavy underwriting losses and a resultant depressed market price for its stock,
was caught completely by surprise; the president was reportedly about to take
off on a vacation trip. After a number of ineffectual countermoves, the Phoenix
management announced it had begun merger discussion with the Travelers
group of insurance companies. The rumored terms were better than the out-
standing tender offer. This blunted the bidding group's attack, and the offer
was withdrawn. In May the merger was submitted to shareholders of both
Phoenix and Travelers and approved, giving Phoenix shareholders Travelers
stock valued at approximately $73 a share.
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agement normally should not be precluded from seeking such a
defensive merger. 19
Defensive mergers usually follow a rather predictable pattern.
Because it knows the details of the original bid, the white knight
typically offers more favorable terms to the target's shareholders.
The bidder may parry this prospective defensive merger by (1)
proceeding with its original tender or exchange offer, (2) raising
the price of its offer, or (3) proposing its own merger with the
target, to be considered in the same proxy vote as the white
knight's proposal. Management must play this game fairly by tak-
ing care not to "stack the deck" with misleading disclosures re-
garding the tender offer, with misleading statements regarding
the proposed merger,12 ° or through sales of stock to the white
knight prior to the shareholder's vote. 12' The contest is ulti-
mately decided by the shareholders, who select the offer that they
prefer. In this context, it is important to note that while the pro-
posal of a defensive merger may make it less likely that the bid-
der's offer will be accepted by the target's shareholders, the
shareholders still retain the right to receive the bidder's offer and
to make their own determination.
Although a defensive merger is a more radical tactic than a
dividend increase, it does not usurp the decisionmaking power of
the target's shareholders, nor does it harm them economically. It
is therefore difficult to understand why a defensive merger
should be prohibited even if its "primary purpose" is to block the
likely success of the bidder's offer. So long as the shareholders are
given full and accurate disclosure about both the bidder's offer
and the proposed defensive merger with the white knight, they
should be given the opportunity to choose the alternative which
they deem most beneficial to their interests. Allowing the
119 A board has particular responsibilities as to certain defensive steps, such as
encouraging a defensive merger. If a merger can be arranged with a sound
company in a tax-free transaction for securities which plainly appear to have a
value higher than the cash tender price, it is obvious that the board is acting in
the best interests of the shareholders in approving the merger and recommend-
ing rejection of the tender. Even for those shareholders who wish cash, the
recommendation of a friendly merger at a higher price in securities will nor-
mally result in an increase in the target's stock price so that those holders can
sell in the open market. Risks to the management are also substantially elimi-
nated since any such merger will require the approval of the target company's
shareholders.
Butler, supra note 9, at 233-34.
120 See H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (Ist Cir. 1973).
121 See text accompanying notes 125-32 infra.
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shareholders their free choice in a fair game promotes the fun-
damental objectives of the Williams Act.
C. Defensive Tactics Which Preclude or Materially Impede Shareholder
Determination
Defensive tactics that impede or preclude a target's sharehold-
ers from considering a bidder's offer should be judged under a
more stringent standard than the disclosure test advanced for de-
fensive tactics that allow shareholders to make their own invest-
ment decision. Currently, under the primary purpose test, man-
agement all too often can prevail by obfuscating the actual reason
for the tactic. This situation, however, can be easily remedied by
altering the analaytical framework of these situations. The party
challenging the target's defensive tactics should have to dem-
onstrate that the bidder's offer was a factor in inducing target
management to take the defensive action at that time. Once the
plaintiff proves the above, target management then should be re-
quired to rebut the presumption by showing that the primary
purpose of the particular defensive tactic was not to effectively
impede or preclude shareholder consideration of the offer. 2
Imposing a rebuttable presumption on the target corporation
in this manner makes good sense. First, the target's management
has the easiest access to information explaining the purpose of its
tactics. 123 Second, this test does not interfere with a corporation's
internal affairs; it merely requires the target corporation to ex-
plain its conduct, after the plaintiff establishes basic facts that tend
to show a violation of the Williams Act. If target management can
rebut this presumption, then courts should hold that section 14(e)
has not been violated.
Any management action that precludes or materially impedes
the shareholders from considering a hostile takeover offer argu-
ably arose from a desire to defeat the tender offer. Any other
position ignores the realities of the corporate world. Management,
however, may have seriously contemplated the challenged action
122 The test proposed in this Article would apply only to civil actions, and not to crimi-
nal actions. The authors express no opinion on the proper presumptions for criminal
cases.
123 See MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343, at 806-07 (2d ed. E.
Cleary 1972); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv. 906, 911
(1931).
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before it knew of the takeover attempt.1 2 4  Or a very attractive
corporate opportunity may have arisen during the course of a
tender offer, and management may have unquestionably pursued
it even in the absence of the offer. In such situations, courts
should focus on whether target management intended its actions
to benefit the shareholders or to effectively impede or preclude
their consideration of the bidder's offer.
Examples of defensive tactics that preclude or materially im-
pede shareholder consideration of a bidder's offer include is-
suance of stock to a friendly party and defensive acquisitions.
1. Issuance of Stock
Issuing shares to a friendly party constitutes one defensive
tactic open to management. This action might discourage a bidder
from making an offer or reduce the probability that the bidder
will acquire the desired percentage of the target's stock. While this
hostile ownership of a large block of the target's stock may dull a
bidder's enthusiasm, this tactic also directly dilutes the sharehold-
ers' ownership and voting rights. Consequently, this action
lessens each shareholder's voice in determining whether the bid-
der will acquire the requisite ownership of shares.
Applied Digital Data Systems, Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp.,' 25 il-
lustrates the manner in which a target's sale of stock can be det-
rimental to a shareholder's right to consider a bidder's offer.
After Applied Digital announced its intent to make an exchange
offer for Milgo's stock, the target negotiated the sale of 312,000
unissued common shares to a friendly third party. 126  These
shares constituted approximately 15.5 percent of the total shares
of common stock and, when coupled with management's 6.5 per-
"24 But the management's knowledge of the particular takeover attempt may be irrele-
vant. Where the bidder has made a prolonged effort to gain control, the relevant time
frame should be the beginning of the bidder's struggles rather than the start of its last
campaign. Thus, in Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the principal purpose of the issuance of
stock to a trust was to dilute the bidder's voting strength. This holding discounted evidence
indicating that management had contemplated such a sale for over a year. Id. A possible
reason for this outcome may be that the bidder had sought control for approximately the
same length of time.
125 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
126 The proposed purchaser of the stock was Racal Electronics, a United Kingdom cor-
poration. Racal and Milgo each owned a 50% interest in another United Kingdom corpora-
tion which distributed Racal's products in foreign markets. In 1974 and 1975, Racal con-
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cent ownership interest,127 would have ensured that over 20 per-
cent of Milgo stock was owned by parties hostile to the tender
offer. If the negotiated sale were consummated, the remaining
Milgo shareholders could not receive a tax-free exchange, because
less than eighty percent of Milgo's shares would have been ex-
changed.12 8
In addition, the Milgo management structured the sale so
that shareholder approval would not be required. Management
had originally planned to sell 382,300 shares or 18.4 percent of
Milgo's common stock but lowered the amount to 15.5 percent
when informed that the New York Stock Exchange would not
qualify the higher number of shares for listing on the Exchange
without shareholder approval. Thus, not only did the target's
management choose a defensive tactic which foreclosed sharehold-
ers from considering the bidder's offer, but it consciously de-
signed a maneuver that bypassed shareholder approval. 29
Judge Weinfeld held that the plaintiff had shown "to the
degree necessary to justify preliminary relief" that the sale had no
valid business purpose and that its "sole purpose was in fact to
defeat the proposed exchange offer and prevent the Milgo
shareholders from exercising their rights under it." 130 He there-
fore issued a preliminary injunction restraining Milgo from con-
summating the sale of its stock.13 '
A target's sale of stock or shares during a tender offer should
receive close scrutiny. Although the Applied Digital c6urt reached
the proper result, other cases may not provide a factual pattern
that clearly reveals management's purpose. When a target's man-
agement attempts to ensure defeat of a takeover attempt by sell-
ing stock to a friendly third party, it materially impedes and pos-
sibly precludes shareholder consideration of the bidder's offer.
Such action evidences a feeling by management that its share-
holders cannot be entrusted with ultimate control over the cor-
poration.
templated purchasing Milgo stock, but the plans were abandoned prior to Applied Digital's
offer. Id. at 1148-49.
127 Id. at 1158.
128 Id. at 1158 n.50. See generally I.R.C. § 368(a)(1).
129 The court stated that: "There can be no question that the purpose of the reductions
[in the number of shares sold to Racal] was to eliminate the need for stockholder ap-
proval." 425 F. Supp. at 1159.
130 Id. at 1158.
131 Id. at 1161.
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A target choosing to sell stock will probably argue, as did
Milgo's management, that it sought to infuse working capital into
the corporation to take advantage of corporate opportunities. 132
Certainly a sale of shares for cash will provide a corporation with
additional funds to finance existing or proposed projects. In most
instances, this fact will create difficulty in showing that the trans-
action has no business purpose. A management sensitive to the
protection of shareholder interests, however, should recognize
that sales of stock during the pendency of a takeover attempt can
dramatically affect the balance of power within a corporation;
such a management should give serious consideration to the sus-
pension of sales of stock discussed and negotiated prior to a bid-
der's announcement. As the Milgo Court noted, a target's man-
agement should not be permitted to sell stock if it would "deprive
[the] shareholders of opportunities accruing to them by virtue of
their stock ownership." 133 At the very least, the Williams Act
should require a target's management to demonstrate that the
primary purpose of a stock sale during a takeover attempt was not
to materially impede or preclude shareholder consideration of the
bidder's offer.
2. Defensive Acquisition
A target corporation may decide to block the bidder's
takeover atter~pt by acquiring another corporation. If the corpo-
ration is acquired through an exchange of stock, the number of
outstanding shares in the target corporation will be increased. Just
as in the direct issuance of stock for cash to friendly parties, this
action may thwart a bidder because he may be unable to acquire a
sufficient percentage of stock.
Alternatively, management may seek a defensive acquisition
of a company in the bidder's business for the purpose of interpos-
ing an antitrust obstacle to the bidder.' 34  Either the target's
132 Id. at 1158.
133 Id.
134 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 66, at 254-56. These measures can be as
successful as they are ingenious.
One company, on learning of an impending bid from another firm,
promptly acquired a business that competed with the bidder in lines accounting
for 80% of its total sales. The move, of course, was designed to raise the specter
of monopoly in connection with the expected bid. When the bid was an-
nounced, the subject company filed an antitrust suit, confident that the bidder
would be forced to withdraw. This proved correct, since to divest itself of the
conflict of interest would have meant severing practically the whole company.
Hayes & Taussig, supra note 108, at 146.
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management or the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice may institute suit to block the bidder's takeover attempt be-
cause of potential violations of the federal antitrust laws. 135
Although sales of stock to friendly parties often materially
impede the stockholders' ability to make their own determination
about the future of the company by diluting their ownership in-
terest, a defensive acquisition, by raising antitrust barriers, may
totally preclude the shareholders from considering the offer.
Thus, management should bear the burden of demonstrating that
its primary purpose in making the defensive acquisition was not to
materially impede or preclude shareholder consideration of the
bidder's offer.
In Royal Industries, Inc. v. Monogram Industries, Inc., 136 the
court considered the legitimacy of a target corporation's defensive
acquisition in light of section 14(e). On October 21, 1976, Mono-
gram announced its intentions to make a cash tender offer to Royal
shareholders 137 for a majority of Royal's common stock.1 38  On
the following day, Royal's management and counsel set proce-
dures in motion to acquire Sar Industries, Inc., one of Mokio-
gram's competitors,'139 and a company with whom Royal had no
prior contact. 4 ' A Letter of Intent was executed on October
26th which provided for a cash payment by Royal of over one
million dollars for fifty-one percent of Sar's stock, 14' and an
135 See, e.g., Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286, at 92,833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978). The Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 erected a technical antitrust hurdle to the
tender offeror. A tender offeror, unless exempt from the Act's provisions, must notify the
Justice Department or the Federal Trade Commission 15 days prior to purchasing any
voting securities. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). These government agencies then have the oppor-
tunity to evaluate the transaction for possible antitrust violations. The Act, however, does
not obligate the offeror to provide advance notice to the target corporation of the impend-
ing offer nor does it extend the minimum time for withdrawal of shares tendered by a
target shareholder. For a discussion of the Act, see Leiman, Recent Developments in Takeov-
ers, in EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (PLI) 207, 219-23 (R.
Mundheim, A. Fleischer & B. Vandegrift eds. 1977).
136 [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29,
1976).
137 Id. at 91,134.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 91,134.
140 Royal's attorneys received a phone call from Sar's attorney, who indicated that Sar
had an antitrust lawsuit pending against Monogram and "would like to be helpful to
Royal." Id. at 91,135.
141 A press release issued by Royal failed to specifically mention the actual cash pro-
posed to be paid to Monogram but instead only referred to it as a "sum of cash." The court
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agreement by Royal to advance funds as needed by Sar without any
assessment of interest charges on the advances. 42
The court found that Royal had violated section 14(e) because
the "sole, primary, compelling and controlling purpose of the Sar
acquisition was to thwart the Monogram tender offer."' 43  Al-
though the Royal court reached the proper result, few courts will
again be furnished with a factual record so replete with evidence
of management's improper purpose.4
As with the sale of stock to a friendly party, a target's man-
agement should be held strictly accountable for negotiating a de-
fensive acquisition which deprives shareholders of their opportu-
nity to consider a bidder's offer. By requiring management to
justify its actions once the plaintiff has made a showing that the
action was precipitated by the bidder's offer, target corporations
will be less inclined to waste shareholders' assets through hastily
arranged and economically unsound acquisitions. By allocating the
presumptions in this manner, target management may well find it
in their best interests to take their responsibilities under the Wil-
liams Act seriously. If this result occurs, the target corporation
shareholder will be the ultimate beneficiary.
CONCLUSION
The principle underlying the Williams Act is that sharehold-
ers of a public corporation are entitled to decide the fate of their
company when it becomes the subject of a tender offer. A target's
management, then, should not be allowed to effectively usurp this
shareholders' right by taking actions that preclude or materially
impede a shareholder's right to decide, or to provide shareholders
with less than full disclosure of all the material facts that might
affect their decision. If the target decides to oppose the bidder's
offer as being inadequate, it must be particularly careful to ensure
that its characterization of the bidder's offer is objectively well
found this designation of the price to be a deliberate non-disclosure of a material fact. Id.
at 91,142.
142 Sar had $0.00 in net sales for the last reported period preceding the acquisition. Id.
at 91,135.
143 Id. at 91,136.
144 The court used harsh language throughout its opinion in deriding the purposes of
Royal's management. The court found a statement by Royal that the "'acquisitions of Sar
fits the corporate growth plan of Royal'" to be false and misleading in "that the only way
the acquisition of Sar comports with any 'plan' of Royal management is that it is a part of a
plan to thwart Monogram's proposed offer." Id. at 91,142.
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founded. If the target decides to use defensive tactics that are not
solely communicative in nature, the test used to judge the legiti-
macy of the tactic should vary with the effect that the tactic has on
a shareholder's right to decide. Tactics that are taken for the pur-
pose of materially impeding or precluding a shareholder's right to
decide are illegitimate no matter how complete the disclosure may
be surrounding the use of the tactic. Conversely, tactics that do
not preclude or materially impede a shareholder's decision are
perfectly proper, even when undertaken for the primary purpose
of defeating the bidder's offer, if full disclosure is made. These
standards would effectuate the policy of the Williams Act and
would turn a fast game into a fair game.
